This article presents the foundation for a conflict resolution perspective for understanding judges' activities in processing criminal conflicts along the different stages of the criminal process, primarily in their work towards plea bargaining: a practice that today in the United States accounts for the most significant part of judicial work in the criminal domain. The article begins with briefly presenting the phenomenon of the vanishing trial and the major role plea bargaining embodies in the United States criminal justice system today. Given that role, the article next discusses the need to broaden the perspective of the function of judges in promoting and designing plea bargaining and diversion mechanisms. It continues by outlining a conflict resolution perspective of the criminal justice system, while constructing the notion of "the criminal conflict." Later, the article proceeds to describe judicial discretion in approving plea bargains in criminal conflicts as a hybrid phenomenon, in that it borrows from both legal and conflict considerations. That part will discuss the intersection of alternatives to adjudication and the judicial work of influencing plea bargains and diversion mechanisms, expanded through a few examples of varying judicial intervention practices, which exist today within the criminal process in the United States and Israel.
The article ends with examining comparative challenges of implementing this perception in diverse legal systems and fields of law. It discusses the differences between processing criminal and civil conflicts, and also the differences among common and civil law systems, which also vary in their rate of settlement.
The major claim is that there is a new terrain of decision-making, which can be captured when studying judicial influence on plea bargains and settlements. Judges' activities within that new terrain can be perceived as integrating perceptions of reconstructive law with perceptions of reconstructive conflict. This new space of judicial discretion brings together elements of retributive justice and legalistic reasoning with possibilities of inserting elements of restorative justice and problem solving into the legal domain.
This article also posits the challenge of institutionalizing and mainstreaming modes of conflict resolution, including restorative justice and problem solving, which already exist at the margins, 2 into the mainstream of the criminal justice system. Such a process calls for hybridity and integration, and may require changes in legal education and training for both judges and lawyers. 3 It is true that one significant element of the plea bargaining . 3 The research aims at comparatively studying judicial work towards settlement, both in the criminal and the civil settings; to examine its reference to conflict resolution, [Vol. 32:2 2017] CONSTRUCTIWE PLEA BARGAINING phenomenon is that it shifts authority and discretion from judges to prosecutors, as most of the bargaining occurs between the prosecution and the defense, without involvement of the court. In this paper, however, we address the role of judges as they still perform the most significant role of reviewing and approving plea bargains. It could certainly be that developing a coherent understanding of that judicial role, one that is based on the conflict resolution perspective offered here, may also create a new, more appropriate balance between prosecutorial and judicial authority.
II. THE VANISHING CRIMINAL TRIAL AND THE NEW ROLES OF JUDGES
The U.S. criminal justice system has seen increased rates of plea bargaining in the last decades, with the latest data informing that plea bargaining is the dominant form of conviction, with more than 95% of convicted defendants pleading guilty.' This phenomenon, which is common to the civil cases rate of settlement as well, has been named "the vanishing trial" and has received some comments and debates in legal literature. ' Some scholars have discussed the plea bargaining process from a negotiation, contractual perspective, 6 while others have focused on issues relating to defendants' rights and the power that plea bargaining assigns to the prosecution rather than the courts.! Many have criticized this process and its extensive use within the criminal justice system for various reasons, the principal ones being that plea bargaining encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty,' penalizes defendants for exercising their right to trial,' and more generally, lacks injustice -for it prefers institutional concerns and efficiency, favoring the court system and prosecution over the defendants' rights and the rule of law. Another significant concern raised in that regard is that unlike trials, which are held openly, plea negotiations are mostly held behind closed doors, and thus lack transparency.io Despite ongoing critique," the use of plea bargaining today is increasing and reaching globally, as in civil law countries.
12 Still, it remains debatable whether its use is only a necessary response to court backlog and efficiency concerns, or whether it has its own merit. This paper claims that plea overtones of negotiated sentences, which forcefully 'induce' the defendant to waive constitutional rights."; For a discussion of the power plea bargaining continues to assign 
III. THE CRIMINAL CONFLICT
The function of law as resolving conflicts in society has been commonly considered a byproduct of its authoritative role of determining and assigning rights. Law claims authority, regulates behavior, and provides normative schemes to promote social good. In most of its institutional manifestations, law operates through a system of formal rules established by the state, encompassing criminal and civil affairs. The reference to sanctions is important for the definition of legal norms, and the intense expansion of regulation and legalization of each branch of our daily lives reflects that the need for coercion through legal intervention is an important aspect of current society. Yet, in various research fields today, there is the growing understanding that the existing institutions of law mostly fail to achieve compliance through command and control regimes and that more complex and nuanced responses to crime, violence and conflicts are required in order to promote society. These responses rely on consent and problem solving and pave the way for the understanding of law's central function as conflict resolution and the role ofjudges as conflict resolution experts.' 4 This new role of persuasion is, therefore, not only a necessity enforced by caseload and efficiency concerns, but also a reflection of a significant theoretical transformation of the understanding of law's function in society.
While such assertions seem fit to civil law, we claim that with the required adjustments, they should apply to the criminal domain all the same.
In his book, "Violence Explained," John Burton, one of the fathers of the field of conflict resolution, criticized the legal system as being "no longer an effective means of social control."" Burton writes about the criminal justice system's failure to help eliminate the conditions that have led to deviance and Burton differentiates between two concepts relevant to our discussion of integrating conflict resolution considerations into mainstream judicial workdisputes and conflicts:
Disputes are confined to interpretations of documents or address arguments about material interests in respect of which there are consensus property norms.
Conflicts involve non-negotiable human needs. Many cases of crimes and violence are included in this category. According to Burton, human needs entail: Safety, Belongingness/Love, Self-esteem, Personal Fulfillment, Identity, Cultural Security, Freedom, Distributive Justice, and Participation. 7 Burton offers "provention" as a way to constructively deal with criminal conflicts: it is a mode of intervention that aims to alter social conditions which brought the crime, and it tries to address the basic needs that underlie what is framed as a legal dispute. Following and expanding Burton's vision, we claim that from an interpretive perspective each legal dispute has a social conflict dimension that can be processed and dealt with within the framework of legal procedures. The challenge is not only to step outside of law in order to deal with it, as Burton suggested, but to address the complexity of such conflicts from within.
What is a legal conflict in the criminal context? Originally, criminal law developed as a mode of sublimating interpersonal conflict into public dispute concerning breaking the formal law and interrupting the social order." The transformation of tribal and rural law into a more modern liberal framework has produced friction between the state and the defendant, and has repressed the social and interpersonal conflict which underlies this friction." How do we come back to the underlying conflict, and is it justified? Is it not dangerous to let the offender deal directly with the victim? Is it reasonable to rehabilitate We claim that coming back to the conflict should not be seen as a return to the private, pre-modern encounter, but should rather be understood within a social scene in which much knowledge exists as to the sources of crime and the ways to prevent it. Criminology, sociology and psychology provide us with substantial and valuable knowledge about people's devious behavior, the way to constructively deal with it, and the prospects of changing it. Positive criminology 20 and restorative justice 2 1 may help us in doing so. These approaches provide a robust theory that helps return to the conflict not as a private, unregulated encounter but as a complex, social phenomenon. This social conflict perception, as we will refer to it, has ample consequences for judicial work.
As discussed above, criminal conflicts may include problems of addiction, intimate violence, mental health problems, other disabilities, welfare disparities, cultural gaps, and various other realities. A legal system that addresses these kinds of problems should aspire to constructively transform the conditions underlying the conflict, not only to decide the narrow dispute about which legal norm was violated. Such a system addresses the private conflict as constructed by social factors.
Addressing the legal conflict requires a new sensitivity of the parties, one that transcends the perception of the common adversaries to the formal legal dispute. The basic framework for a criminal legal dispute is a dyad of the state and the defendant. In the new approach, parties may include the victim, the community, and various actors who might have either contributed or were affected by the crime, such as the victim or offender's family members, neighbors, teachers and so forth. When victims are involved, restorative acts may constructively transform the conflict; when welfare conditions are poor, improving them is part of the processing; when cultural gaps are at stake, education and integration may be components of the solution. A legal system that addresses the social criminal conflict will strive to transform the conditions which created it. It will aspire to prevent further conflicts of this kind in general, and will work to prevent recidivism of the present defendant in particular. Such a system will address social needs and not merely legal norms, will be oriented towards the future instead of the past, and will aspire for rehabilitation and restoration through consent instead of retribution through coercion. It will carefully borrow from criminology, sociology and psychology, working with developing interdisciplinary methods.
If we accept the premise that the criminal justice system is supposed to address the social conflict, is it possible to institutionalize such an approach and insert it into the current existing adversarial and retributive system? Suggesting restorative justice as an external process may not contribute to fulfill such a goal. Imposing it as a mandatory, preliminary restorative process in some criminal procedures is a better method for changing the system. A more coherent approach may be to establish problem-solving courts as innovating systems. However, these options remain on the margins, and the notion we would like to promote here is that new perceptions of the criminal justice system may be successfully implemented in mainstream activities within the criminal process, and perhaps especially in judicial work related to plea bargaining, as discussed below.
A judge who addresses criminal conflict from a conflict resolution perspective may work with six organizing narratives of conflict resolution. These various narratives define different modes by which judges may help to transform and reconstruct criminal conflicts, as follows:
Process emphasis. A central theme that inspired the origin of the field of conflict resolution is the concept that "process matters," and that each conflict requires a focused reflection about how to engage with this process. Stepping back from the conflict scene and reflecting about the conflict and the process are acts ofjudgment deferral, which may philosophically helpjudges who deal with plea bargains and criminal cases in general. Judges can ask themselves about the goal of a certain hearing in terms of rehabilitating the offender, empowering the victims, and benefiting the conditions of third parties, such as children. 23 This emphasis may lead to unique practices. Constructive future-oriented intervention. In conflict resolution, process emphasis is combined with a positive mode of intervention. Judges who intervene in criminal conflicts ask themselves how to improve the situation Underlying hidden layer. According to conflict resolution philosophy, the social conditions underlying legal disputes-those which constitute the criminal conflict-are the true essence of the crime that needs to be addressed. Judges should address addiction problems, welfare issues, domestic violence, mental health conditions, and other elements at the core of criminal conflict. Processing these constructively may benefit society and the parties to conflicts. It may also help prevent future crimes.
Hybridity, complexity and deconstruction. The phenomenon of crime is always complex, and the common criminal process tends to oversimplify crime by constructing it as a polar answer of guilty or not guilty. In conflict resolution, "complexifying" the surface of conflicts is a common mode of transforming them. Separating the interest in rehabilitation from that of prevention-balancing retribution with restoration--is a hybrid activity made possible by holding the philosophy underlying the field. Addressing crime as a complex phenomenon that needs to be tackled by deploying various regulation mechanisms and modes of intervention may provide a more effective way to deal with it. Determining the agenda for dealing with various criminal subjects in a manner that will improve them can also contribute to constructive transformation.
Relationship and emotions. In their work, judges can refer to the reality that people are interconnected in relational networks, and can encourage constructive expression of emotions. 24 In contrast to the common criminal legal procedure, which assumes that offenders and victims are individuals who carry legal rights, the conflict resolution-oriented judge will address the networks of relationships underlying the case. 25 They may also address in-
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See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011) (presenting a comprehensive perception of the relevance of relational thinking for lawyers and legal work in general).
2 Bibas writes, in that regard: "[e]ven if the state runs the process, human emotion deserves a seat at the table. Emotion is not some raw, blind passion wholly divorced from and antithetical to reason. It is in part cognitive and evaluative and can be educated. Recent scholarship has impressively defended the importance of giving emotion a role in substantive criminal law alongside reason. Emotions are an important part of what makes us human and how we understand and evaluate our fellow humans' actions. Crime excites fear and anger, empathy and indignation, sorrow and forgiveness. Victims need our solidarity; wrongdoers merit our anger but also empathy for their plight and reasons for breaking the law. This rainbow of emotions is central to appreciating and responding to all the parties' stakes in crime. While the parties have emotional stakes, they must not be judges in their own causes; neutral arbiters must reflect upon and filter the competing emotional claims in order to distill justice. It is time to extend the same emotional logic to court relationships, such as between lawyers, or between counsel and client. Judges may encourage apologies if they have the potential to amend relationships, they can contain a victim's horror, and they can give victims a voice in court while protecting them from unnecessary and intrusive crossexamination. Judges may also consider relationships with third parties-such as children or elderly parents-when sentencing offenders, and may perceive the State as striving to promote constructive relationship transformation, not only retribution according to criminal codes.
Bottom up work. Although judges are authoritative figures and have power over the parties, conflict resolution philosophy suggests that involving the parties in the decisionmaking process may help in constructively transforming the conflict. Judges who show empathy for the accused, create behavioral contact with parties, and encourage participation and choice, may help to encourage more compliance and improve the quality of the intervention.
Judges who acknowledge the conflict resolution perspective of criminal disputes, whether implicitly or explicitly, may reflect this in various moments within the legal procedure. This mindset can inspire judicial decisions on detention and bail conditions, and will influence their willingness to consider diversion mechanisms and various rehabilitation possibilities. Judges will use this sensitivity when approving plea bargains, and can apply it when discussing sentencing and punishment with defendants. In rare cases in which conflicts do result in a trial, judges will utilize conflict resolution principles when hearing the evidence. They may also reflect their conflict resolution sensitivity when writing a legal opinion.
IV. EVALUATING AND DESIGNING PLEA BARGAINS FROM A CONFLICT RESOLUTION PERSPECTIVE
Judicial work concerning plea bargaining is often considered mostly passive and reactionary. 26 Judges are perceived as peripheral figures within the plea bargaining process, considered in itself a negotiation between the State and the offender.
2 7 Judges' significant role lies within their authority to approve (or disapprove) the plea after evaluating it. Although judges rarely disapprove a plea bargain, the possibility of them doing so affects the process criminal procedures. Laymen care whether criminal justice is emotionally sensitive or tone-deaf, and taking these concerns into account should bolster the law's legitimacy." Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 21, at 87-88. 26 See generally MILTON HEUMANN of bargaining and provides a sense of justice and balance.28 Judges are supposed to intervene in the agreement between the State and the offender when the sense of'justice and legal coherence is disturbed.
29 They refer to the "reasonableness" of the plea, 30 perceive it as the common way to deal with criminal cases, and usually focus on the legal considerations that are relevant to the case.
We claim that within this new open terrain of approving plea bargains, judges may be more active in addressing the criminal conflict, thereby constructively transforming it. If the current reality is a culture of settlement and plea bargains, why not focus on it as a constructive landscape for judicial discretion? While the use of plea bargaining emerged from a practical motivation," and while common literature criticizes plea bargains as trading justice for efficiency, our claim is that the pragmatic drive for plea bargaining provides an opportunity for a more comprehensive conflict-oriented approach to legal cases.
3 2 Conflict resolution considerations should supplement the legal considerations currently guiding judge's gatekeeper role in plea bargains.
Consider a judge who examines a plea bargain reached between the prosecution, and the defendant accused of serious property crimes. If this judge was to adopt a conflict resolution perspective at this stage, she might, for example, turn directly to the defendant and make him actively participate in the discussion concerning the plea bargain, and she could attend to the 28 Id at 151 (Statement of defense attorney: "The role of the judge is to keep the system honest, so that prosecutors can't be unrealistic, irrational.").
29 Id. at 152 ("The judge's significance for the plea bargaining process, then, rests in his potential power to upset negotiated dispositions.").
o Id. at 148-49 ("The new judge and the experienced judge have at least one thing in common: neither is preoccupied with developing justifications for plea bargaining....
[T]he newcomer is thrust into the court, and he struggles alongjust to keep his head above water. He reacts to the negotiated dispositions that come before him and, thus, gradually drifts into an acceptance of the plea bargaining system. As he gains experience in the system, he becomes so accustomed to the centrality of the negotiated disposition that he rarely gives much thought to plea bargaining as a 'problem.' Time and time again experienced judges referred to plea bargaining as 'the common-sense way of disposing of cases' or as 'the practical solution for cases.' It was not uncommon for judges who had assumed office without much criminal experience but with a background in civil law to eventually liken the 'reasonableness' of plea bargaining to the 'reasonable' approach followed in negotiating civil cases. Thus, when I pursued questions about plea bargaining, they often fell back on this civil analogy."). underlying aspects of the offenses such as poverty, mental illness, lack of education or profession. When discussing the appropriate punishment this judge will not only consider deterrence or retribution, but will also take into account personal circumstances such as the accused being the main caretaker for three children. If judges take a more active role at the stage of designing the plea (and not only of approving it), they may use restorative justice, integrate welfare services, encourage rehabilitation and choice-making, and may facilitate dialogue, all while performing their mainstream activity. Our claim, which applies to civil and criminal conflicts alike, is that judges may integrate settlement considerations of conflicts with considerations of legalism. The intention here is that although judges cannot facilitate restorative justice as a holistic process or promote a comprehensive scheme for problem solving in a common legal criminal procedure, they can still balance considerations of conflict reconstruction with legal considerations about the application of rules. Their use of legal rules may oscillate between mechanical jurisprudence to balancing social policies and principles, or even promoting social justice. Their perception of conflict resolution may reflect response to needs, amendment of relationship, and even engagement with social identities. This process differs from promoting Burton's "provention" and the constructive transformation of the social conflict he posited as an ideal. It is a hybrid activity that entails holding legal considerations in the shadow of conflict resolution considerations and vice versa. Judges may negotiate with the lawyers of the State and the defense on their agreed terms of plea bargaining 33 and may propose an alternative solution or a trial; 34 they may defendant to an alternative track such as rehabilitation or restorative justice.
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When performing these roles, criminal judges act as conflict resolution experts. 41 Judges may embody the more active role in reference to plea bargains by investing efforts in helping the parties reach an agreement, being actively involved as sort of mediators in designing the plea, and sometimes generating a concrete formula for settling the case brought before the parties in a preliminary hearing setting. Sometimes such interventions are conducted by a judge who presides on the case and has authority to decide it. In other jurisdictions, such interventions are performed by a sort of "criminal settlement judge," whose sole role is to encourage plea bargaining while having no authority to decide the case later.
In the State of Israel, this process is called "criminal mediation" and its use has become very popular in the past years.
42 Specific judges facilitate these hearings and the entire procedure remains confidential from the judge . Elements of restorative justice may be incorporated into the criminal justice system, and restorative practices such as encouraging apology, circle conferencing regarding punishment, and creative solutions may be promoted in both criminal and civil conflicts. Another important element in the discussion of judges' roles is the articulation of Judicial Dispute Design; further inquiry needs to be made regarding unique systems that judges implicitly develop in various conflicts and legal encounters, including the hybrids they construct. For existing literature on Dispute Systems Design ("DSD"), see WILLIAM URY, ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF
CONFLICT (1993).
41 For a detailed outline of the ADR work ofjudges in promoting settlement in general, see Alberstein, supra note 3. 42 This process is regulated through Article 143a to the Israeli Criminal Procedure Act. For discussion on the merits of this process see the following decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court: CA 6508/05 Ploni v. State of Israel (One of the first Supreme Court cases dealing with the use of criminal mediation in Israeli courts. In this case the court established that criminal mediation could be held based on Article 143a, and emphasized the importance of confidentiality in this process.); CA 723/10 Kastel v. State of Israel (in which the Supreme Court emphasized the centrality of confidentiality to criminal mediation); and CA 8417/13 Ploni v. State of Israel (in which judges were divided as to the question of the legal source for conducting criminal mediation, and in which the court listed a few of the central features of this process; among them, the need for the parties' free choice of mediation, mediation not being subject to rules of procedure, and the need to keep mediation separate from other procedures in the case). presiding over the case itself. The hearings are held at designated times, at times behind closed doors, and are thus somewhat separated from the day-today hustle and atmosphere of the criminal court. These features create a unique environment that allows for open communication between the parties, and on behalf of the judge as well. A few examples ofjudges' conduct in such hearings may illustrate the potential of the conflict resolution perspective and its relevance for judges' work when plea bargaining is the core of the procedure.
During criminal mediation hearing observations, 4 3 we could identify judges performing different conflict resolution activities such as negotiation, mediation, problem solving, dialogue facilitation and dispute design. The role of the judge in negotiating with both the defendant and the prosecution was dominant, as was the role of the judge as a go-between the parties. Judges evaluated offers suggested by the parties, routinely provided evaluations and estimations for the outcome of the case were it to be adjudicated, and gave their own offers for final outcomes. These evaluations provided a valid framework for the bargaining process and helped define the differences between the parties.
However, the setting offered by criminal mediation hearings allowed judges to do more than simply play an important role in the bargaining process. Judges could involve family members of the defendant, discuss rehabilitation programs and prospects, caucus with attorneys without defendants, and communicate with the defendants themselves (whether directly addressing the defendant or implicitly conveying messages by speaking to the attorneys).
For example, in a case involving a private criminal defamation complaint, the judge constructed a letter of apology with the parties while addressing and discussing the emotional difficulties of both parties. The parties in that case went back and forth, in and out of the courtroom, discussing specific wording of the letter offered by the judge. In another case, which involved the defendant's difficult personal circumstances (addiction, children with disabilities), rehabilitation and treatment possibilities within jail were discussed as part of the creation of a plea. These examples demonstrate both the potential that the focus on plea bargains provides forjudges and the various modes of acknowledging the conflict resolution perspective that exist today within criminal judges' activity.
Lastly, the question ofjudges' work in promoting plea bargaining that also addresses the social conflict should be examined comparatively across different legal systems. In our current research, we are examining the Israeli, 43 These examples are based on our own preliminary observations in such hearings held in numerous Israeli courts, by various judges, between November 2015 and February 2016.
Italian and United Kingdom systems: in it, we seek the conflict resolution perspective and look for the possibility of improvement through empirical studies and training. What will be the significance of a continental-law judge processing a criminal conflict? Does the inquisitorial nature of the system imply that judges will be less conflict consideration-oriented, since plea bargains are less expected? Does the judge's tendency to seek truth in a more straightforward mode align with a conflict emphasis?
What are the implications of importing a conflict perspective that crosses the divide between criminal and civil law into three legal systems? The idea of the criminal conflict may be less appealing in legal systems in which most cases are adjudicated after a full trial. The question follows: is "the vanishing trial" a globalizing phenomenon which is part of the growth of any legal system? Although such questions are still very broad and imply multiple directions of implementation and development, addressing them in a comparative manner is significant to the perception of law in contemporary society.
The criminal conflict is a broader phenomenon than the legal dispute, and addressing it constructively requires judges to perform unique skills and methods which can be borrowed from the conflict resolution field. Considering the phenomenon of the "vanishing criminal trial," judges in any case are now required to address the reality of conflict and not only questions of legality. This necessity may become a broader terrain for a more comprehensive and constructive processing of legal criminal conflicts. A few examples exist today as to such potential, but a clearer articulation of the jurisprudence of conflict resolution and the various methods which judges may use can help to improve the criminal justice system and provide new perspectives on the role of law in society.
